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 Introduction 1 
 Wellbeing – or the prudential good life – refers to how well someone’s life is going  for him 
or her (Crisp,  2014 ). Increasingly, awareness of the limitations of traditional economic indi-
cators has led researchers to call for scientifi c measures of wellbeing to augment traditional 
measures (Diener et al.,  2009 ; Diener and Seligman,  2004 ; Layard,  2005 ). Th e main problem 
with measures of per capita production, income and wealth is that they do not attribute 
direct value to many factors widely viewed as essential to high wellbeing, including rela-
tionships, health and happiness (Helliwell,  2006 ). In light of this problem and the atten-
dant research, national governments and multinational organisations are investigating new 
measures of wellbeing to inform policy making (Diener,  2009 ; Stiglitz et al.,  2009 ). Over the 
last decade, many of these new measures have been incorporated into various policymaking 
processes (see Diener et al.,  2009 ). Within this movement toward new measures of wellbe-
ing, some researchers are calling for the importance of mental health to be recognized by 
including various measures of mental health in any collection of key policy outcomes (e.g. 
Bok,  2010 ; Layard,  2005 ; Layard and Clark,  2014 ). 
 To pave the way for a focus on wellbeing policy in the context of mental health and recov-
ery specifi cally (e.g. see Jarden, Jarden & Oades, this volume), this chapter briefl y reviews 
the history of this debate, the current challenges of using measures of wellbeing and mental 
health for policy making, and some of the possibilities for meeting these challenges. We 
conclude that, with public backing, it would be appropriate for governments to measure 
mental health and wellbeing, and for the resultant data to inform policy making generally, 
and specifi cally as it relates to mental  health . 
 Why  Measure Wellbeing, Mental Health, and Recovery? 
 Th e limits of Gross  Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP) have been 
discussed by economists and many others for quite some time (Diener et al.,  2009 ). Eco-
nomic historians would point out that most of these perceived limitations are caused by 
the more recent use of these measures as general gauges of societal progress, rather than as 
a tool to assess the rate of economic growth (England,  1998 ). Th e limitations of GDP and 
 1  Th is chapter is based on an earlier paper by the same authors, “Th e science of happiness for 
policymakers: An overview,” published in the  Journal of Social Research & Policy , Volume 4, Issue 2, 
2013. We thank the editor of the  JSR&P for allowing us to reproduce some material here. 
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GNP as general measures of progress were perhaps most passionately espoused by  Robert F. 
Kennedy in his speech at the University of Kansas in 1968:
 Too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and commu-
nity values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our Gross National Product, now, is 
over $800 billion dollars a year, but that Gross National Product – if we judge the United States 
of America by that – that Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising 
and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and 
the jails for the people who break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss 
of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and 
armored cars for the police to fi ght the riots in our cities. It counts … the television programs, 
which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national product does 
not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. 
It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence 
of our public debate or the integrity of our public offi  cials. It measures neither our wit nor our 
courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to 
our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it 
can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are  Americans . 
  (Kennedy,  1968 ) 
 Th e message was clear; there are many things that we value highly that are not captured by 
GDP and  GNP . In response to this and other shortcomings of the existing economic indica-
tors, researchers, national statisticians, and several nongovernmental organisations began 
to investigate and measure other policy goals, including human, social, and environmental 
capital (Carneiro and Heckman,  2003 ). In addition to broadening and refi ning the existing 
range of economic measures, these initiatives led to the collection of data related to individ-
ual wellbeing, quality of life, and happiness (Michalos,  2011 ). Academics from several dis-
ciplines and various countries, and some civil servants, have been increasingly pushing for 
these new measures of wellbeing to play more important roles in policy making (e.g. Bok, 
 2010 ; Layard,  2005 ; Stoll et al.,  2012 ). Over the last few years, politicians have also become 
engaged. For example, in 2008, French President Nicolas  Sarkozy chartered the Commis-
sion on the Measurement of Economic Performance and  Social Progress. Th e Commission, 
headed by Nobel-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, advised that their report
 … is addressed, fi rst of all, to political leaders. In this time of crises, when new political nar-
ratives are necessary to identify where our societies should go, the report advocates a shift  of 
emphasis from a “production-oriented” measurement system to one focused on the well-being 
of current and future generations, in other words, toward broader measures of social  progress . 
  (Stiglitz et al.,  2009 , p. 10) 
 Shortly aft erward the British Prime Minister,  David Cameron, announced the investigation 
and subsequent measurement of wellbeing by the British government:
 [F]rom April next year, we’ll start measuring our progress as a country, not just by how our 
economy is growing, but by how our lives are improving; not just by our standard of living, but 
by our quality of life. 
  (Cameron,  2010 ) 
 However, it may yet transpire that supranational organisations, such as the  United Nations 
(UN) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and  Development (OECD), may end 
up leading the way in promoting the use of broader measures of wellbeing in policy making. 
For example, in April 2012, the UN General Assembly held a high-level meeting in New 
York on Happiness and Wellbeing: Defi ning a New Economic Paradigm. Importantly, the 
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agenda for this meeting included the use of measures of subjective wellbeing (for which 
 individuals are asked to report on how well they think their lives are going). Indeed, the 
 World Happiness Report , which was commissioned for the meeting, contained a chapter on 
“Th e state of world happiness” that relies exclusively on research using measures of subjec-
tive wellbeing because “they capture best how people rate the quality of their lives” (Helliwell 
and Wang,  2012 , p.11). 
 Th e assessment of subjective wellbeing is probably the most contentious issue in the 
wider debate about the new measures of societal progress. For example, Cameron’s 
announcement that the UK government would begin collecting data on subjective well-
being received mixed reviews (Cohen,  2011 ; Fitzpatrick,  2011 ; Vaillant,  2011 ). However, 
even major traditional economic organisations are beginning to stress the importance of 
subjective wellbeing. For example, the OECD ( 2013 ) has identifi ed measures of subjective 
wellbeing (e.g. self-reported overall satisfaction with life) as essential for a complete under-
standing of wellbeing. 
 Lord  Richard Layard, one of the most prominent proponents of the use of measures of 
subjective wellbeing, recommended that “quality of life, as people experience it, ought to be 
a key measure of progress and a central objective for any government” (Layard,  2011 ). Posi-
tions similar to Layard’s are held by individuals such as  Derek Bok ( 2010 ), Ed Diener ( 2011 ), 
and Bruno Frey ( 2008 ).  Layard has argued that measures of subjective wellbeing should be 
the main yardstick for public policy because happiness is the most important goal in life for 
most of us (Layard,  2005 ). Happiness is “what people want for their children and for their 
fellow citizens” and thereby “the greatest happiness of all” deserves to be the ultimate goal of 
governments and policy makers (Layard,  2005 , pp. 124–125). Layard understands happiness 
as meaning “feeling good – enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be maintained” (2005, 
p. 12) and believes that the emerging fi eld of wellbeing science has come far enough to 
accurately measure this kind of happiness using subjective survey questions. Th us, accord-
ing to Layard, we should be using data from subjective survey measures of happiness and 
wellbeing to inform policy making. However, the use of subjective measures of happiness 
and wellbeing as the only or ultimate criterion to assess specifi c policies or progress in gen-
eral has been criticised by philosophers and economists on many grounds (e.g. Diener and 
Scollon,  2003 ; Frey and Stutzer,  2007 ). 
 In addition, several scholars have argued that happiness is understood diff erently by 
 diff erent individuals and in diff erent cultures (Joshanloo,  2014 ; Th in,  2012 ), and also that 
happiness is not always viewed as positive (Joshanloo and Weijers,  2014 ). However, while 
several researchers have concerns about happiness being the supreme aim of public pol-
icy, or even  an aim of policy at all in some cultures, happiness as an aim of public policy 
in Western cultures seems to be fairly well supported (e.g. Bok,  2010 ; Diener,  2006 ,  2011 ; 
Diener and Scollon,  2003 ; Frey,  2008 ; Frey and Stutzer,  2007 ). If the citizenry of a demo-
cratic state demand that its government include subjective wellbeing as one of its overar-
ching goals, then there is reason for policy makers to investigate measuring happiness and 
other subjective reports of the good life, and then use the resulting data as one of a set of 
guides for public policy. While citizens demanding that their government measure their 
subjective wellbeing might seem unlikely, a 2005 BBC opinion poll, which asked whether 
the government’s main objective should be the “greatest happiness” or the “greatest wealth,” 
returned a clear verdict, with 81% reporting that happiness should be the main goal (Eas-
ton,  2006 ). Th is result resembles a poll taken on  Th e Economist ’s website in 2011 during a 
debate between  Richard Layard and Paul Ormerod, in which the motion “new measures of 
economic and social progress are needed for the 21st-century economy” (using happiness 
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 science to inform policy making was the focus of the debate) received 83% of the support of 
the online audience. If these results are representative of popular opinion, then, in democra-
cies at least, the practicality of measuring happiness for policy making should be investigated. 
Furthermore, since happiness is usually understood as being a subjective state (Layard, 
 2005 ), the practicality and processes of measuring subjective wellbeing for policy making 
should be investigated. 
 A closer look at the more detailed works by the researchers discussed above reveals a 
near-uniform preference for focusing initial subjective-wellbeing-related policy interven-
tions on those with the worst subjective wellbeing. In most cases, the general argument in 
favour of focusing on those already worst off  is that the gains are more easily achievable, and 
that it seems inhumane to help fairly happy people become very happy when others are suf-
fering (Bok,  2010 ; Layard,  2005 ; Layard and Clark,  2014 ). Layard and Clark ( 2014 ) detail the 
great disparity in how much the UK government spends on physical health care compared 
with mental health care. Th ey make a convincing case for modest increases in mental health 
spending making a big diff erence in the quality of life of thousands of unhappy people. In 
particular, they argue that getting the right help to people with mental illnesses could enable 
them to recover and live much more fulfi lling lives and be more productive members of 
society. Th us policies targeted at mental health and recovery initiatives more than pay for 
themselves when broader range policy goals are  considered . 
 An Overview of Measuring Subjective  Wellbeing, 
Mental Health and Recovery 
 Whether the use of measures of mental health and happiness for policy making should be 
pursued depends not only on how important mental health and happiness are to people, but 
also on whether they can be effi  ciently and accurately measured. Of all the new methods for 
measuring happiness, only survey questions are currently practical on scales large enough to 
be useful for public policy. For example, survey questions asking for respondents’ judgments 
about how happy or satisfi ed they are with their lives can be quickly and cheaply dissemi-
nated via online survey technology. Furthermore, the use of online surveys enables respond-
ents’ answers to be formatted into usable data quickly. In contrast, collecting wellbeing data 
with behavioral measures, such as expert observations, tracking devices, or neuroimaging 
techniques, is likely to be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. It is also unclear 
if any of these more objective measures are better at capturing how happy people are than 
simply asking them (Layard,  2005 ). 
 Subjective measures of wellbeing can be global or domain-specifi c. Global measures aim 
to assess respondents’ judgments of their lives as a whole, while domain-specifi c measures 
target aspects of respondents’ lives, such as their work lives, family lives, health, or fi nances. 
Although domain-specifi c measures have their uses (see Huppert et al.,  2009 ), the focus in 
this chapter is on global measures because they provide a better approximation to the terms 
‘happiness’ and ‘wellbeing’ as they are normally understood, and also usefully generalize 
across various states of mental health by way of individuals’ subjective experience. 
 Th ere are a wide range of global subjective wellbeing questions (Diener,  2009 ), but most 
are subtle variants of general questions about happiness or satisfaction with life. For example, 
the United States’  General Social Survey asks, “Taken all together, how would you say things 
are these days? Would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” 
(Kahneman and Krueger,  2006 , p. 6). Th e World Values Survey asks, “All things considered, 
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 how satisfi ed are you with your life as a whole these days?” and uses a response scale rang-
ing from “1 (not at all satisfi ed)” to “10 (very satisfi ed)” (Ingleheart et al.,  2008 ). Th e subtle 
variations on these questions usually amount to changing the number of available points on 
the response scale, or slightly adjusting the wording of the question (e.g. “in general,” “all 
things considered”). For example, the World Values Survey also asks the following question 
about happiness: “Taking all things together, would you say you are … Very happy … Rather 
happy … Not very happy … Not at all happy” using a four-point response  scale . 
 Global subjective wellbeing questions elicit responses that are biased by aspects such as 
contextual factors, the specifi c wording of questions, the order and type of preceding ques-
tions, and respondents’ current moods (see OECD,  2013 ). Experiments have shown that 
contextual factors, such as the weather (Schwarz and Clore,  1983 ) or unexpectedly fi nding 
a dime (Schwarz,  1987 ), signifi cantly aff ect how satisfi ed participants reported being with 
their lives. Experiments on the variability of self-reported satisfaction with life within indi-
viduals have demonstrated that people’s reported satisfaction with life as a whole can change 
over a period of a few weeks (Kahneman and Krueger,  2006 ; OECD,  2013 ). 
 However, large representative samples and careful psychometric survey creation can 
avoid or mitigate these issues. Indeed, many of these potential biases can be avoided because 
they are random biases, which tend to aff ect diff erent people at diff erent times. Th erefore, 
by conducting surveys on large representative samples (e.g.  n = 10,000+: Th e Sovereign New 
Zealand Wellbeing  Index , Jarden et al.,  2013 ), the impact of random bias tends to cancel 
itself out (the law of averages) and is thereby considerably reduced. In this way, sampling can 
eliminate the potential bias associated with personal variations in mood and localized varia-
tion in important events (e.g. sports teams winning or variations in the weather). Th e eff ects 
of recent events and participants’ current moods can also be reduced by using a battery of 
questions about satisfaction with life, such as the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 
 1985 ), instead of just one question (Lucas et al.,  1996 ). To prevent the small but robust eff ects 
that specifi c questions have on subsequent responses to the more global questions, research-
ers usually put global questions fi rst on their surveys (Schimmack and Oishi,  2005 ). Measures 
that span both mental health and wellbeing, such as the  Mental Health Continuum – 
Short Form (Keyes,  2005 ) and the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-Being Scale (Tennant, 
Hiller, Fishwick, Platt, Joseph, Weich, et al.,  2007 ), have also been  developed . 
 Challenges in Using  Measures of Subjective 
Wellbeing to Inform Policy Making 
 Many criticisms have been leveled at the use of wellbeing science to inform policy. Th ree of 
the most pertinent criticisms will be briefl y discussed here: that survey measures of happi-
ness and wellbeing are too insensitive to be useful, that we cannot know what measures of 
happiness and wellbeing are really measuring, and that the wrong kind of happiness and 
wellbeing is being measured. 
 Are Happiness and Wellbeing Scales Insensitive? 
 Johns and Ormerod ( 2008 ) claim that time series happiness data are insensitive. Put simply, 
if time series happiness data are insensitive, then the happiness scores will not change enough 
in response to environmental changes for us to be 95% confi dent that the small changes in 
the happiness scores are not simply a product of chance. While insensitivity is a problem 
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 for many measures of happiness, it is not an insurmountable one. Th e argument for the 
insensitivity of time series happiness data that Johns and Ormerod put forward is based on 
a discussion of one measure of happiness with a three-point response scale. Th is particular 
selection is somewhat misleading because most recent and contemporary happiness ques-
tions have larger response scales. Indeed, many of the subjective wellbeing scales currently 
in use have ten or eleven response options – for example, the life satisfaction question from 
the World Values Survey (question V22), the wellbeing questions used in the Gallup  World 
Poll (Gallup Inc.,  2008 ), or the questions in Work on Wellbeing (Work on Wellbeing,  2015 ). 
Moreover, as the OECD report and guidelines (OECD,  2013 ) indicate, the trend is to larger 
and more discriminant response scales (e.g., the OECD recommends that national statisti-
cal offi  ces use 0–10 scales, with 0 representing an absence of the construct measured rather 
than the opposite of the construct – allowing even further discrimination of variables, and 
thus increased sensitivity). Even if there were not a trend toward more discriminant scales, 
researchers have routinely discovered statistically signifi cant changes in time series happi-
ness data even over short periods of time, and even in Johns and Ormerod’s home nation of 
the United Kingdom (e.g. Ingleheart et al.,  2008 ). 
 Th erefore, although worries about the insensitivity of happiness measures are not com-
pletely unfounded, they do not provide a good reason to avoid using time series happiness 
data to guide policy. Indeed, many time series happiness studies can be useful for policy 
making in several ways (Frey,  2008 ). For example, careful comparison of survey data from 
similar nations, or other groups, where policy change has occurred in some groups but 
not others, can help to evaluate the eff ects of policy change on reported  wellbeing (Turton, 
 2009 ). 
 Do  Measures of Happiness and Wellbeing Really Assess 
Happiness and Wellbeing? 
 Th ere are currently a number of diff erent methods that are claimed to be measures of hap-
piness and wellbeing (Lopez and Snyder,  2003 ). Th ese include  brain scans (neuroimaging), 
daily reports of feelings, the opinions of participants’ friends or colleagues, the opinion of an 
expert, the amount of time participants smile and, most commonly, survey questions (Lopez 
and Snyder,  2003 ; Weijers,  2010 ). Importantly, there are a range of survey questions about 
happiness and wellbeing, many of which are worded very diff erently. Some ask about posi-
tive and negative feelings, satisfaction with life, whether you would change anything about 
your life and, of course, happiness. Th e results of these diverse survey measures tend to cor-
relate with one another and the nonsubjective measures just mentioned (Layard  2005 ). Kroll 
( 2010 ), Layard ( 2005 ), and Bok ( 2010 ) all argue that these correlations should encourage us 
to have faith in the validity of subjective measures of wellbeing. Indeed, the high signifi cance 
of these correlations does provide good evidence that answers to survey questions about 
happiness and wellbeing are related to the relevant nonsubjective assessments. However, 
since the correlations are also never close to being large, we also have good evidence that 
the various measures are not assessing the same phenomenon (Weijers,  2010 ). So the most 
reasonable answer to the question heading this subsection is that measures of happiness 
and wellbeing really do assess happiness and wellbeing, but with each measure assessing a 
related but diff erent conception of happiness and wellbeing. Simply being clear about which 
measures (and related conceptions) are being used pretty well resolves this problem for pol-
icy makers. However, this solution also highlights our next  problem . 
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 How Do We Know If We Are Measuring the  Right Kind of 
Happiness and Wellbeing? 
 It is well known by happiness researchers that the various questions in wellbeing surveys are 
not tracking the same phenomena (Dodge et al.,  2012 ). Indeed, many social scientists and 
philosophers recognize that the diff erent kinds of questions used in subjective wellbeing 
surveys oft en endorse one particular theory of wellbeing (e.g. Feldman,  2010 ; McDowell, 
 2010 ). Do these diff erences matter if the measures are assessing something that is obvi-
ously good? We suggest that for policy-relevant research, yes, they do (or at least they may, 
depending on the details). 
 What if fi ndings based on diff erent measures of wellbeing imply diff erent policies? Th is 
is not just a theoretical problem, as many seemingly contradictory results from wellbeing 
science show. For example, Diener et al. ( 2010 ) provided evidence that the more a measure 
of subjective wellbeing asks about the respondents’ emotional lives, and the less it encour-
ages them to engage in cognitive deliberation about how satisfi ed they are with their lives 
compared with what they might have been, the smaller and less signifi cant the relationship 
between increases in income and increases in subjective wellbeing becomes. So, in this case, 
the choice of a subjective wellbeing measure might aff ect policy decisions about income 
redistribution. 
 How ought the problem of apparently contradictory fi ndings from the science of well-
being to be resolved? First, researchers should avoid generalizing fi ndings from diff erent 
measures of wellbeing, unless those questions have been shown to track the same phenom-
ena in the same circumstances in other studies. Second, policy makers should always refer 
to the original research papers, and even the survey questions themselves, if the researchers 
have not made the phenomena obvious (Weijers,  2010 ). Having found that the contradic-
tory wellbeing science fi ndings are based on the use of diff erent measures of wellbeing, what 
should a policy maker do? Discovery of such a confl ict illuminates the fundamental problem 
policy makers intent on using wellbeing science face, which is, “Which question or ques-
tions about subjective wellbeing are the most appropriate basis for policy making?” 
 Policy makers should not expect to have to answer this question by themselves. Philos-
ophers have debated the merits of various theories of wellbeing for at least two thousand 
years (Weijers,  2010 ), and social scientists have been debating which measures of wellbeing 
are the most valid, reliable, and representative of the best philosophical theories of wellbeing 
(Huppert et al.,  2009 ; McDowell,  2010 ). Unfortunately, there is still no agreement between 
academics on which question about subjective wellbeing is the most appropriate basis for 
policy making. However, there are many candidates whose advantages and disadvantages 
have been discussed at length (e.g. Helliwell and Wang,  2012 ; Huppert et al.,  2009 ), and new 
proposals about how to resolve this issue continue to emerge (Forgeard et al.,  2011 ; Taylor, 
 2015 ). Th is academic knowledge needs to be discussed widely to engender public debate 
about what makes people’s lives go well for them and the proper aims of government. A 
populace that is informed about what makes citizens’ lives go well for them will be able to 
exercise its democratic rights to lobby (and perhaps vote) for its members’ preferred con-
ception of wellbeing (Weijers,  2010 ). When this occurs, policy makers can work with social 
scientists to ensure that appropriate measures of wellbeing are used to guide public policy. 
Th is approach will allow happiness researchers to be confi dent that they are producing fi nd-
ings that are relevant for policy making, and policy makers to benefi t fully from happiness 
science. 
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 Th ese potential problems just discussed for subjective measures of happiness and well-
being apply equally to general measures of mental health. If subjective measures of mental 
health are not sensitive enough to external factors, or if they do not capture the elements 
that are widely viewed as essential to mental health, then they will not be useful to policy 
makers. However, the solutions discussed above also apply in equal measure. Perhaps most 
importantly, researchers have demonstrated how a subjective wellbeing approach can create 
policy-friendly information (Fujiwara and Campbell,  2011 ), including information on men-
tal health  issues (Fujiwara and Dolan,  2014 ). 
 What  Roles Should Mental Health, Happiness, 
and Wellbeing Play in Policy Making? 
 In any democratic society, citizens should decide what conceptions of mental health, hap-
piness, or wellbeing are important and the extent of the roles any such conceptions should 
play in policy making. In order to educate citizens and encourage eff ective evidence-based 
policy making, academics and top-level civil servants need to better clarify the various 
conceptions of mental health, happiness, and wellbeing and whether we can accurately 
and effi  ciently measure them. Aft er these issues have been clarifi ed, the circumstances and 
policies that aff ect mental health, happiness, or wellbeing (as defi ned in each case) should 
be investigated to help better understand where each concept fi ts in the economic, political, 
and cultural landscape and also to promote public debate on the relevant merits of certain 
kinds of happiness and mental health. Initial steps have been taken to provide sketches 
of what public policies based on happiness research might look like at the local (Rablen, 
 2012 ), national (Bok,  2010 ; Di Tella and MacCulloch,  2006 ; Dolan and White,  2007 ) and 
international levels (Di Tella and MacCulloch,  2006 ), but specifi c and thoroughly justifi ed 
recommendations are only just beginning to emerge. Philosophers, psychologists, econo-
mists, statisticians, political scientists, and policy makers should work together collabora-
tively on this important endeavor in order to pool their collective expertise and progress 
most eff ectively. Th e conference series “Wellbeing and Public Policy” by Morrison, Weijers 
and Jarden (Morrison and Weijers,  2012 ), which began in 2012, is one such collaborative 
eff ort. 
 Mental health, happiness, and wellbeing are clearly important values. However, the scope 
and depth of the roles of these values in public policy are ultimately in the hands of govern-
ments and citizens around the world. One of the goals of this book is to provide rigorous 
and contemporary scientifi c fi ndings about what we can and might be able to do to enhance 
the mental health and wellbeing of various subgroups and populations. We hope that this 
information will be used to inform future policies that enhance people’s mental health and 
 wellbeing . 
 References 
 Bok ,  D. ( 2010 ).  Th e politics of happiness: What governments can learn from the new research on 
well-being .  Princeton, NJ :  Princeton University Press . 
 Cameron ,  D. ( 2010 ). A transcript of a speech given by the Prime Minister on wellbeing on 25 
November 2010. Available at  http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-speech-on-well-being/ . 
 Carneiro ,  P. , &  Heckman ,  J. J. ( 2003 ).  Human capital policy . In  Heckman ,  J. J. , &  Krueger ,  A. (Eds.), 
 Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies ?  Cambridge, MA :  MIT Press . 
 Cohen ,  R. ( 2011 ). Th e happynomics of life. New York Times, 12 March 2011. 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316339275.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Waikato Library, on 21 Mar 2018 at 19:57:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
Chapter 4: Wellbeing Policy: An Overview 43
 Crisp ,  R. ( 2014 ). Well-being. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.),  Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2014 ed.). Available at  plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/well-being/ . 
 Diener ,  E. ( 2006 ).  Guidelines for national indicators of subjective well-being and ill-being .  Applied 
Research in Quality of Life ,  1 ,  151 – 157 . 
 Diener ,  E. ( 2009 ).  Assessing well-being: Th e collected works of Ed Diener .  Dordrecht :  Springer . 
 Diener ,  E. ( 2011 ). Happiness,  Economist debates. Th e Economist, 18 May 2011. Available at  http://
www.economist.com/debate/days/view/702 . 
 Diener ,  E. ,  Emmons ,  R. A. ,  Larsen ,  R. J. , &  Griffi  n ,  S. ( 1985 ).  Th e Satisfaction with Life Scale .  Journal 
of Personality Assessment ,  49 ,  71 – 75 . 
 Diener ,  E. ,  Kahneman ,  D. ,  Tov ,  W. , &  Arora ,  R. ( 2010 ).  Income’s diff erential impact on judgments of 
life versus aff ective well-being . In  Diener ,  E. ,  Kahneman ,  D. &  Helliwell ,  J. F. (Eds.),  International 
Diff erences in Well-Being (pp. 3–15).  New York, NY :  Oxford University Press . 
 Diener ,  E. ,  Lucas ,  R. E. ,  Schimmack ,  U. , &  Helliwell ,  J. F. ( 2009 ).  Well-being for public policy .  Oxford, 
UK :  Oxford University Press . 
 Diener ,  E. , &  Scollon ,  C. ( 2003 ). Subjective well-being is desirable, but not the summum bonum. 
Unpublished manuscript. Presented at the University of Minnesota Workshop on Well-Being. 
Available at  http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:2gjgl65fdpQJ:scholar.google
.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5 . 
 Diener ,  E. &  Seligman ,  M. E. P. ( 2004 ).  Beyond money: Toward an economy of wellbeing . 
 Psychological Science in the Public Interest ,  5 ,  1 – 31 . 
 Di Tella ,  R. , &  MacCulloch ,  R. ( 2006 ).  Some uses of happiness data in economics .  Journal of 
Economic Perspectives ,  20 ( 1 ):  25 – 46 . 
 Dodge ,  R. ,  Daly ,  A. P. ,  Huyton ,  J. , &  Sanders ,  L. D. ( 2012 ).  Th e challenge of defi ning wellbeing . 
 International Journal of Wellbeing ,  2 ( 3 ),  222 – 235 . 
 Dolan ,  P. ,  Peasgood ,  T. , &  White ,  M. ( 2008 ).  Do we really know what makes us happy? A review of 
the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being .  Journal of Economic 
Psychology ,  29 ,  94 – 122 . 
 Dolan ,  P. , &  White ,  M. P. ( 2007 ).  How can measures of subjective well-being be used to inform public 
policy ?  Perspectives on Psychological Science ,  2 ( 1 ),  71 – 85 . 
 Easton ,  M. ( 2006 ). Britain’s happiness in decline, BBC News, 2 May 2006. Available at  http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/happiness_formula/4771908.stm . 
 England ,  R. W. ( 1998 ).  Alternatives to Gross Domestic Product: A critical survey . In  Ackerman ,  F. , 
 Kiron ,  D. ,  Goodwin ,  N. ,  Harris ,  J. , &  Gallagher ,  K. P. (Eds.),  Human Wellbeing and Economic Goals 
(vol. 3, pp. 373–402).  Island Press . 
 Feldman ,  F. ( 2010 ).  What is this thing called happiness ?  Oxford, UK :  Clarendon Press . 
 Fitzpatrick ,  M. ( 2011 ).  Mad men take over the coalition .  British Journal of General Practice ,  61 ( 582 ),  71 . 
 Forgeard ,  M. J. C. ,  Jayawickreme ,  E. ,  Kern ,  M. , &  Seligman ,  M. E. P. ( 2011 ).  Doing the right 
thing: Measuring wellbeing for public policy .  International Journal of Wellbeing ,  1 ( 1 ),  79 – 106 . 
 doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i1.15 . 
 Frey ,  B. S. ( 2008 ).  Happiness: A revolution in economics .  Cambridge, MA :  MIT Press . 
 Frey ,  B. S. , &  Stutzer ,  A. ( 2002 ).  What can economists learn from happiness research ?  Journal of 
Economic Literature ,  40 ( 2 ),  402 – 435 . 
 Frey ,  B. S. , &  Stutzer ,  A. ( 2007 ). Should national happiness be maximized? Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics, University of Zürich, working paper 306, March 2007. Available at  http://
www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp306.pdf . 
 Fujiwara ,  D. , &  Campbell ,  R. ( 2011 ). Valuation techniques for social cost-benefi t analysis: Stated 
preference, revealed preference and subjective well-being approaches. HM Treasury Green 
Book Discussion Paper. Available at  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/valuation-
techniques-for-social-cost-benefi t-analysis . 
 Fujiwara ,  D. , &  Dolan ,  P. ( 2014 ). Valuing mental health: How a subjective wellbeing approach can 
show just how much it matters. UK Council for Psychotherapy, January 2014, 1–20. 
 Gallup Inc . ( 2008 ).  World Poll questions .  Washington, DC :  Gallup Inc . Available at  http://media.
gallup.com/dataviz/www/WP_Questions_WHITE.pdf . 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316339275.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Waikato Library, on 21 Mar 2018 at 19:57:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
Section 1: Where Are We Now?44
 Helliwell ,  J. F. ( 2006 ).  Well-being, social capital and public policy: What’s new ?  Economic Journal , 
 116 ( 510 ),  C34 – C45 . 
 Helliwell ,  J. F. , &  Wang ,  S. ( 2012 ). Th e state of world happiness. In Sachs, J., Helliwell, J. F., & Layard, 
R. (Eds.), World Happiness Report. Commissioned for the United Nations. Available at  http://
www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefi les/fi le/Sachs%20Writing/2012/World%20Happiness%20Report
.pdf (accessed 4 September 2013). 
 Huppert ,  F. A. ,  Marks ,  N. ,  Clark ,  A. ,  Siegrist ,  J. ,  Stutzer ,  A. ,  Vittersø ,  J. ,  et al. ( 2009 ).  Measuring well-
being across Europe: Description of the ESS well-being module and preliminary fi ndings .  Social 
Indicators Research ,  91 ( 3 ),  301 – 315 . 
 Ingleheart ,  R. ,  Foa ,  R. ,  Peterson ,  C. , &  Welzel ,  C. ( 2008 ).  Development, freedom, and rising 
happiness: A global perspective (1981–2007) .  Perspectives on Psychological Science ,  3 ( 4 ), 
 264 – 285 . 
 Jarden ,  A. ,  MacKay ,  L. ,  White ,  K. ,  Schofi eld ,  G. ,  Duncan ,  S. ,  Williden ,  M. ,  et al. ( 2013 ).  Th e Sovereign 
New Zealand Wellbeing Index . Psychology Aotearoa ,  5 ( 1 ), pp.  22 – 27 . 
 Johns ,  H. , &  Ormerod ,  P. ( 2008 ).  Th e unhappy thing about happiness studies .  Real-World Economics 
Review ,  46 ,  139 – 146 . 
 Joshanloo ,  M. ( 2014 ).  Eastern conceptualizations of happiness: Fundamental diff erences with 
Western views .  Journal of Happiness Studies ,  15 ( 2 ):  475 – 493 . 
 Joshanloo ,  Mohsen , &  Weijers ,  Dan ( 2014 ).  Aversion to happiness across cultures: A review of where 
and why people are averse to happiness .  Journal of Happiness Studies ,  15 ( 3 ):  717 – 735 . 
 Kahneman ,  D. , &  Krueger ,  A. B. ( 2006 ).  Developments in the measurement of subjective well-being . 
 Journal of Economic Perspectives ,  20 ( 1 ),  3 – 24 . 
 Kennedy ,  R. F. ( 1968 ). Speech at University of Kansas, March 18. Transcript available at  http://www
.glaserprogress.org/program_areas/pdf/Remarks_of_Robert_F_Kennedy.pdf . 
 Keyes ,  C. L. M. ( 2005 ).  Mental illness and/or mental health? Investigating axioms of the complete 
state model of health .  Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology ,  73 ,  539 – 548 . 
 Kroll ,  C. ( 2010 ). Social democracy and happiness.  Social Europe Journal . Available at  http://www
.social-europe.eu/2010/01/social-democracy-and-happiness/ . 
 Layard ,  R. ( 2005 ).  Happiness: Lessons from a new science .  London, UK :  Penguin . 
 Layard ,  R. ( 2011 ). Happiness,  Economist debates. Th e Economist, 17 May 2011. Available at  http://
www.economist.com/debate/days/view/698 . 
 Layard ,  R. , &  Clark ,  D. ( 2014 ).  Th rive: Th e power of evidence-based psychological therapies .  London, 
UK :  Penguin . 
 Lopez ,  S. J. , &  Snyder ,  C. R. (Eds.) ( 2003 ).  Positive psychological assessment: A handbook of models and 
measures .  Washington, DC :  American Psychological Association . 
 Lucas ,  R. E. ,  Diener ,  E. , &  Suh ,  E. M. ( 1996 ).  Discriminant validity of well-being measures .  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology ,  71 ( 3 ),  616–28 . 
 McDowell ,  I. ( 2010 ).  Measures of self-perceived well-being .  Journal of psychosomatic research ,  69 ( 1 ), 
 69 – 79 . 
 Michalos ,  A. C. ( 2011 ).  What did Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi get right and what did they get wrong ? 
 Social Indicators Research ,  102 ,  117 – 129 . 
 Morrison ,  P. S. , &  Weijers ,  D. ( 2012 ).  Wellbeing in Wellington: A report on the June 2012 Wellbeing 
and Public Policy Conference .  Policy Quarterly ,  8 ( 4 ),  51 – 55 . 
 OECD (Organisationfor Economic Cooperation and Development) . ( 2013 ). Your Better Life Index: 
Executive summary. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available at 
 http://oecdbetterlifeindex.org/wpsystem/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/YourBetterLifeIndex_
ExecutiveSummary3.pdf 
 Rablen ,  M. D. ( 2012 ).  Th e promotion of local wellbeing: A primer for policymakers .  Local Economy , 
 27 ( 3 ),  297 – 314 . 
 Schimmack ,  U. , &  Oishi ,  S. ( 2005 ).  Th e infl uence of chronically and temporarily accessible information 
on life satisfaction judgments .  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,  89 ( 3 ),  395 – 406 . 
 Schwarz ,  N. ( 1987 ).  Stimmung als information [Mood as information].  Heidelberg, Germany : 
 Springer Verlag . 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316339275.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Waikato Library, on 21 Mar 2018 at 19:57:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
Chapter 4: Wellbeing Policy: An Overview 45
 Schwarz ,  N. , &  Clore ,  G. L. ( 1983 ).  Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative 
and directive functions of aff ective states .  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,  45 ( 3 ),  513–23 . 
 Stiglitz ,  J. E. ,  Sen ,  A. , &  Fitoussi ,  J. P. (Eds.) ( 2009 ).  Report by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress .  Paris :  Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress . 
 Stoll ,  L. ,  Michaelson ,  J. , &  Seaford ,  C. ( 2012 ).  Well-being evidence for policy: A review .  London, UK : 
 New Economics Foundation . Available at  http://scholar.google.co.nz/scholar?q=%22Well-being+
evidence+for+policy%3A+A+review%22&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=1%2C5 . 
 Taylor ,  T. E. ( 2015 ).  Th e markers of wellbeing: A basis for a theory-neutral approach .  International 
Journal of Wellbeing ,  5 ,  79 – 80 . 
 Tennant ,  R. ,  Hiller ,  L. ,  Fishwick ,  R. ,  Platt ,  S. ,  Joseph ,  S. ,  Weich ,  S. ,  et al. ( 2007 ).  Th e Warwick–
Edinburgh mental well-being scale (WEMWBS): Development and UK validation .  Health and 
Quality of Life Outcomes ,  5 ( 1 ),  63 .  doi:101186/1477–7252–5–63 . 
 Th in ,  N. ( 2012 ).  Counting and recounting happiness and culture: On happiness surveys and 
prudential ethnobiography .  International Journal of Wellbeing ,  2 ( 4 ),  313 – 332 . 
 Turton ,  D. ( 2009 ).  Th e real dirt on happiness studies: A reply to “Th e unhappy thing about happiness 
economics.”  Real-World Economics Review ,  49 ,  83 – 89 . 
 Vaillant ,  G. ( 2011 ).  Th e happiness eff ect .  Bulletin of the World Health Organization ,  89 ( 4 ), 
 246 – 247 . Available at  http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0042–
96862011000400005&lng=en&tlng=en .  10.1590/S0042–96862011000400005 . 
 Weijers ,  D. ( 2010 ). A warning to policy-makers: What exactly is well-being anyway?  Social Europe 
Journal . Available at  http://www.social-europe.eu/2010/09/a-warning-to-policy-makers-what-
exactly-is-well-being-anyway/ . 
 Work on Wellbeing . ( 2015 ). Available at  http://www.workonwellbeing.com . 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316339275.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Waikato Library, on 21 Mar 2018 at 19:57:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
